

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO RESEARCH DESIGN

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2021 • lecture 3



THE STORY SO FAR

- neopositivism
 - dualism + phenomenalism
 - systematic search for cross-case covariation through hypothesis-testing
- realism
 - dualism + transfactualism
 - undetectable causal powers, vetted in the lab or via transcendental argument, in case-specific combinations

DUALISM

- philosophical ontology
 - the situation of the observer/knower
 - about a *relation*, not about “mind” or “world”
- dualism = “mind-independent world”
 - the world *is* some way in and of itself
 - mind *discovers* world; world *pre-exists* mind

MONISM

- not “idealism”
 - privileging ideas (mind) over the material (world) presumes dualism
 - idealism = reverse Descartes
- not “subjectivism”
 - autonomous knowing subjects presume dualism
 - thinking does not make things so

DIS-SOLUTION OF DESCARTES

- start with embedded and embodied knowers
 - no constitutively autonomous subjects
 - no mind-independent world to be known; no world-independent minds to know it
- *process* is central
 - in particular, the process of constructing knowledge
 - practical involvement comes first!

(LATER) WITTGENSTEIN

- language-games...
- no private rules; no private languages
- ...and forms of life
- tacit agreement about how to decide



INTERSUBJECTIVITY


- priority of the “between”
 - structured/organized/arranged social space
 - start outside of any individual minds, but not outside of *all* minds
- no independent knowers
 - can't just make stuff up
 - change and continuity are both negotiated outcomes

WEBER


- an editorial statement
- ideal-types: deliberate oversimplification
- not “ideals” (but: utopias)
- not “pure types” (but: both abstract and idealized)
- culturally grounded



IDEAL-TYPIIFICATION



IDEAL-TYPIFICATION



IDEAL-TYPICAL ANALYSIS

- central role of *imagined* counterfactuals
 - counterfactual \neq perfect comparative case
 - helps the community of researchers decide what is causal and what is not
- configurations of factors/processes are key
 - always more than one ideal-type involved
 - mediating tensions key to social life

MONIST PHENOMENALISM

- can't have knowledge of anything beyond possible experience
- ideal-typical tools are instruments for generating knowledge of observables and detectables
- explanation, not critique
 - “value-clarification,” not value *correction*

BEYOND INSTRUMENTALITY

- knowledge expresses a set of values...
- ...but that set itself is socially determined
 - “language-game” names the epistemic status, but not the content
 - “form of life” points to social foundations, but does not unpack them

HEGEMONY AND MARGINALITY




- “objectivity effect” of shared assumptions
 - similarity of social origin affects scientific knowledge
 - likewise, similarity of experience based on gender, race, etc.
- not about *who*, but *what* and *where*
 - *what* assumptions
 - *where* the observer is standing

REFLEXIVITY

- know where you stand
- know what assumptions ground your theories and concepts
- can't know this perfectly...
- ...but strive to become aware through dialogue

REFLEXIVITY

- places to start:
 - workers
 - intellectuals
 - women
 - racial minorities
- common thread is *marginality*



MONIST TRANSFACTUALISM

- monist: mind and world co-occur
- transfactual: deep structures shape activities of knowledge-production
 - not realism: can't use labs or transcendental argument
 - instead, find the traces of structure in our daily activities
- theory as therapy: reflexivity dispels illusion

REFLEXIVE EXPLANATIONS

- start with self-location
 - not an optional add-on
- adopt a marginal perspective
 - seeing from the limits is *epistemically* preferable
- knowledge critiques society
 - provokes a response, dialectically
 - pay attention to effects